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3. Linking Carbon Markets: Legal and Institutional 
Issues and Lessons for Northeast Asia 
MICHAEL MEHLING
SUMMARY
RULES AND INSTITUTIONS MATTER WHEN LINKING. Domestic and international laws govern 
the form and process of a link and also set out substantive conditions and restrictions. Once established, 
the operation of a link will benefit from defined procedures and institutions. Provision should be made 
for routine coordination as well as systemic change. Case studies of existing links, such as those between 
California, Ontario, and Québec and the European Union and Switzerland, highlight the importance 
of sustained dialogue, mutual transparency, and a commitment to shared principles. Over time, robust 
governance structures will prove as important to a functioning Northeast Asian carbon market as technical 
alignment of system design. 
LINKING CARBON MARKETS: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL LESSONS FOR 
NORTHEAST ASIA
When considering a link between carbon markets, attendant decisions will be primarily guided by 
environmental, economic, and political considerations, including questions such as its expected 
distributional effects or its impact on aggregate emissions. Implementation of the link will eventually give 
rise to more technical questions, for instance, on the arrangements to account for emission transfers across 
linked registries. What these questions have in common is that they usually allow for a range of different 
answers, subject to the relative merits of alternative outcomes. 
Legal and institutional questions related to linking tend to yield more rigid answers, however, and will 
usually apply to a narrower subset of issues, such as the legal authority to link and the legal form of a link’s 
implementation. In some cases, the law may set out binary stipulations, requiring or proscribing a specific 
course of action, and affording limited or no flexibility to policy makers. In other cases, legal considerations 
may not mandate a specific outcome but will still affect the desirability of a link. Understanding the legal 
implications of linkage is therefore important when evaluating alternative approaches and their respective 
consequences.
Generally, legal norms can be distinguished by whether they address formal questions, such as 
institutional powers and procedures, or questions of substance. In the context of linking, formal aspects 
tend to dominate the legal assessment, including issues such as the mandate to negotiate a link, the form 
and process of linkage, and the procedures and institutions underpinning the routine operation, as well 
as the termination, of the link. These questions can overlap, for instance, when the legal authority to link 
has implications for the form or applicable procedures. Being primarily formal in nature, they do not 
necessarily affect the substantive choices reflected in or shaping an actual link.
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Such legal and institutional questions transcend geographies, temporal contexts, and—to an extent 
—differences among respective political, economic, and legal systems. They must be grappled with across 
any prospective linkage setting, and Northeast Asia will prove no exception. Regional linkage efforts there 
would benefit from coalescing around core legal considerations, and from looking to linkage experiences 
elsewhere for lessons and guidance.
Legal Authority 
Linking emissions trading systems can facilitate the transfer of significant revenue streams across 
jurisdictions and will affect compliance costs under linked emissions trading systems as well as, potentially, 
their environmental integrity. Any decision to link should therefore be based on a solid legal mandate to 
avoid or minimize subsequent challenges, whether these occur through judicial channels or in the arena of 
political debate and public opinion. Ideally, the authority to link will thus stem from formal legislation; a 
link that is based purely on a political decision or administrative regulation could be seen as deficient in 
terms of its legitimacy, and the transparency and accountability of the preceding process.
In the European Union, for instance, the directive establishing its regional carbon market contains a 
mandate to explore agreements with “third countries…to provide for the mutual recognition of allowances” 
and goes on to specify procedural requirements as well as material and formal restrictions on the scope 
and partners of the link.1 Likewise, a rule adopted by the Californian legislature allows for linkage but 
requires that any linking partner have “adopted program requirements for greenhouse gas reductions… 
that are equivalent to or stricter than those required” in California.2 By including these provisions in 
formal legislation, both jurisdictions have created a robust basis for carbon market cooperation with other 
jurisdictions.
Form and Process
A link between carbon markets can assume various forms, with differences in degree, scope, and the 
direction of trading flows. Conceptually, a link can be either direct or indirect, with a direct link allowing 
trade both within and between different systems,3 whereas an indirect link occurs when one system links to 
a second system that is, in turn, linked to a third system. Direct links are conditional on an explicit linking 
decision by at least one of the linked jurisdictions4 and can be further distinguished by whether unit flows 
are possible in one or more directions.
A unilateral link involves a jurisdiction recognizing units from one or more foreign systems without 
those systems necessarily reciprocating. It can be established through a simple clause specifying the 
conditions for recognition and any applicable restrictions, for instance, on the type or number of units. By 
the same token, a unilateral link can be altered or terminated at any point in time and does not narrow the 
sovereignty of the jurisdiction establishing the link. It is that flexibility which explains why a majority of 
links currently in place are unilateral.
A bi- or multilateral link, by contrast, requires two or more jurisdictions to agree on the mutual recognition 
of units and allows trade to occur in all directions across systems.5 As a result, these links will generally 
necessitate some form of coordination between systems to synchronize the required adjustments, ranging 
from the mere decision to simultaneously accept foreign units for compliance purposes to more ambitious 
levels of integration, such as an agreement upon the trajectory of reduction obligations in each scheme.6
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Different instruments are available to facilitate and formalize such coordination. Jurisdictions seeking 
to link may opt to negotiate and formally enter a binding international treaty, which offers a transparent 
and predictable framework for transactions across linked trading systems, yet it is also subject to a number 
of legal constraints and procedural requirements. As one of the recognized sources of international law, a 
treaty can, as a rule, be concluded by formal subjects of international law only,7 entailing what is often a 
cumbersome ratification or approval process. Likewise, 
withdrawal from the treaty and subsequent amendments 
will only be possible under the provisions for adjustment 
or suspension set out in the treaty.8 An example of 
linking through a formal international treaty is the link 
between the European Union and Switzerland, presented 
in greater detail in the pages that follow.
Coordination for a bi- or multilateral linkage can also 
occur by way of a political understanding on the mutual 
recognition of carbon units, coupled with domestic 
adjustments to each system. In legal terms, this alternative 
will be similar to the unilateral link described earlier, 
albeit with the difference that affected jurisdictions will 
establish unilateral links on a reciprocal basis. Such reciprocal links have the benefit of obviating lengthy 
ratification procedures and avoiding other restrictions imposed by domestic and international law, yet 
they still leave each linking jurisdiction with the flexibility to terminate the link or adapt it to changing 
circumstances as needed. 
Details of the underlying political understanding can be formalized by a political agreement, such as 
a memorandum of understanding (MoU), and elaborated in technical guidance or standards. While these 
arrangements document the intent to cooperate, they lack the binding force of a treaty, entailing a residual 
risk of adjustments to, or even suspension of, the link by one of the participating jurisdictions, for instance, 
following political changes such as a domestic election. Such unforeseen disruptions can significantly 
impact the linked market and may even affect the broader economies of participating jurisdictions.9 An 
example of multilateral linkage through a political agreement with mutual recognition of units and legal 
and administrative coordination is the link between California, Québec, and Ontario, which is described 
in greater detail in the pages that follow.
In sum, formalized legal agreements between linking parties provide the most overt and clearly defined 
rules and procedures and both express and protect the expectations of parties better than other linking 
instruments. But these agreements can also be difficult to achieve, and they will create real or perceived 
barriers for entry vis-à-vis future linking parties. Less formalized approaches based on MoUs can lower such 
barriers and prove more palatable, particularly during the early stages of linking efforts, but they will likely 
possess less legal and procedural clarity and less operational predictability once the linkage takes shape.
Procedures and Institutions 
Once emissions trading systems are integrated through linkage, the discussion invariably shifts to 
considerations of ongoing governance and routine management of the link.10 Such matters acquire 
Formalized legal agreements 
between linking parties provide 
the most overt and clearly 
GHÀQHGUXOHVDQGSURFHGXUHV
and both express and protect 
the expectations of parties better 
than other linking instruments.
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particular relevance in the event of critical changes to the link; to the linked trading systems; or to the 
context they operate in, for instance, due to suspension or termination of the link, amendments to design 
features of a trading system, or unexpected economic or environmental circumstances affecting the linked 
market.11 To ensure smooth operation of the link, parties may establish institutional arrangements that go 
beyond the link itself, ranging from ongoing procedures such as recurrent consultations and notification 
duties all the way to a standing entity endowed with specified administrative and rule-making functions.12
At an early stage of integration, cooperation tends to be more informal and occurs through loose 
arrangements geared toward exchange of information, promotion of uniform approaches and standards, 
stakeholder involvement, and outreach activities. Such cooperation will typically precede an actual link and 
will help establish the necessary conditions for eventual trading between systems.13 Rather than adopt binding 
standards or recommendations, the resulting networks will be largely limited to issuing recommendations 
and providing advice on the implementation and harmonization of trading schemes.14 As emissions trading 
systems converge and their linkage enjoys greater political support, however, participating jurisdictions can 
opt for more formal arrangements to sustain and further strengthen market integration. Where separate 
emissions trading systems have not yet been introduced, such cooperation can also take the form of a 
common design framework harmonizing key features of the emissions trading systems and specifying joint 
procedures and institutional arrangements to ensure readiness for linkage from the outset.
Design features that can be harmonized over time or through a common design framework include 
common principles and standards for scope and coverage; allowance allocation; and measurement, reporting, 
and verification. Joint procedures can include mutual notification and information duties; external review 
or reciprocal monitoring of the emissions trading systems; and periodic meetings of representatives from 
each system to discuss items for harmonization, such as cost containment mechanisms. Harmonization can 
also extend to technical aspects, such as the registry software and auctioning platform used by participating 
jurisdictions and may result in the creation of an institution, such as a secretariat facilitating operation of 
the linked market through coordination, data collection, oversight, and broader administrative functions 
such as registry maintenance.
At a more advanced stage of integration, participating jurisdictions may opt for the establishment of a 
more formal institution with independent legal personality, a constitutive mandate, and defined governance 
structures. Such an organization could be afforded genuine powers to elaborate and enforce market rules in 
pursuit of its mandate, for instance, to facilitate market integration and convergence, uphold environmental 
performance and integrity, and safeguard market efficiency and functioning. Aside from the example of the 
supranational European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), where the European Commission (EC) 
has gradually acquired greater and more centralized authority as the system administrator,15 no linkage has 
to date resulted in the creation of such an entity with independent regulatory and enforcement authority, 
although some conceptual proposals have envisioned a central institution mandated with powers akin to those 
presently exercised by central banks, such as strategic interventions in the supply of tradable allowances.16
Substantive Considerations
Aside from questions of form, process, and institutions, legal considerations can also arise with regard 
to the material content of the link. At a minimum, a link requires a stipulation that foreign units be 
recognized for compliance, a determination that will generally be made effective through an amendment of 
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the instruments establishing each trading system. Additionally, the link may need to account for differences 
in the type and definition of tradable units, impose quantitative or qualitative restrictions on foreign units 
(such as aggregate import limits), or apply any other adjustments—for instance, a discount or exchange 
rate—to reflect differences in their mitigation value.17 In the case of bi- or multilateral linking, the treaty or 
informal arrangement between parties to the link may specify the rights and duties of each party, including 
procedures and penalties for any arising disputes.
Because each link emerges into an existing landscape of legal norms, moreover, it will invariably 
interact with different areas of material law. Areas of law that can have a bearing on the link range from 
high-level constitutional precepts—such as basic rights, general principles, and institutional mandates—
to more specific issue areas—such as contract law, tort law, property law, taxation and accounting rules, 
financial services regulation, and criminal law.18 Over time, the sustained viability and political acceptance 
of a trading link will depend on its ability to secure consistency of these written and unwritten norms, 
principles, and material provisions. Otherwise, it not only risks being annulled through a judicial challenge 
but also may undermine the validity of any transactions carried out under the link and, in the longer term, 
the legitimacy and acceptance of the link itself. Generalizations are difficult when assessing the relevance 
of substantive law to linkage, as that will necessarily depend on the particularities of the specific context.19
Adding further complexity to this question are the multiple sources of law and levels of governance that 
can set out relevant material law. Mostly, the areas of law cited in the preceding paragraph will originate 
in national law, which will generally have effect only within the jurisdiction in which it was adopted.20 
Indirectly, such rules may nonetheless affect entities in other linked jurisdictions, for instance, when the 
favorable status afforded to market participants in one jurisdiction results in “forum shopping”21 or alters 
the distribution of units across jurisdictions. Material provisions governing both the form and substance 
of a link may also be found in supra- or international law, as exemplified by the mandate set out in the 
directive establishing the EU ETS, or the operational provisions to engage in voluntary cooperation under 
Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement (see chapter four of this volume) that are currently being elaborated and 
will apply between all parties to the Agreement.
CASE STUDIES AND LESSONS LEARNED
California-Ontario-Québec Linking Agreement
On October 1, 2013, California and Québec entered an arrangement to link their respective trading 
systems by January 1, 2014.22 Ontario subsequently joined this arrangement, which was revised to reflect 
evolving circumstances, on September 22, 2017.23 Despite being designated an “agreement,” the linking 
arrangement was not legally binding, given the federate states’ and provinces’ lack of power to conclude 
formal treaties under public international law. All three jurisdictions expressly acknowledged this in the 
preamble when they stated, “the present Agreement does not, will not and cannot be interpreted to restrict, 
limit or otherwise prevail over each Party’s sovereign right and authority to adopt, maintain, modify or 
repeal any of their respective program regulations.”
As the second iteration of the instrument coordinating one of the most successful links between 
emissions trading systems in different jurisdictions, the agreement between California, Ontario, and 
Québec offers valuable insights into the material and procedural provisions of a link. It is structured in 
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five chapters, titled “General Provisions,” “Harmonization and Integration Process,” “Operation of the 
Agreement,” “Miscellaneous Provisions,” and “Final Provisions.” Central to the establishment of the link is 
the commitment to “provide for the equivalence and interchangeability of compliance instruments issued 
by the Parties for the purpose of compliance with their respective cap-and-trade programs” and “permit 
the transfer and exchange of compliance instruments between entities registered with the Parties’ respective 
cap-and-trade programs using a common secure registry” (Article 1 [b] and [d]), an objective that is 
operationalized by the “mutual recognition of the Parties’ compliance instruments” (Article 6). Regulatory 
harmonization is defined as one of the primary objectives of the linking arrangement (Articles 1 [a] and 4), 
and implementation of the foregoing commitments and other provisions is acknowledged in the preamble 
to require domestic regulatory adjustments by each party. Differences between trading systems and any 
design changes are addressed through consultations and cooperative efforts at harmonization between both 
parties (Article 3). Parties also undertake to cooperate in the application of these harmonized rules, for 
instance, in the area of market supervision and enforcement (Article 11).
A further tenet in the linking arrangement between California, Ontario, and Québec is the agreement 
to “develop and implement an accounting mechanism” that provides for transparency and to promote 
“the sharing of information to support effective administration and enforcement” of each trading system 
(Article 1 [c] and [g]). In terms of institutional structures, the linking arrangement specifies that parties 
“shall continue coordinating administrative and technical support through the WCI, Inc.,” a nonprofit 
corporation established in 2011 to provide administrative and technical support to participants in the 
Western Climate Initiative. Among its functions is the administration of a joint registry and joint auctions. 
Additionally, the agreement establishes a Consultation Committee composed of one representative from 
each party, a role assigned ex officio to specific offices in each jurisdiction, who meet “as needed to ensure 
timely and effective consultation in support of the objectives of this Agreement” (Article 13).24
EU-Switzerland Linking Agreement 
Following several years of—at times strained—negotiations, the EU and Switzerland agreed on criteria 
and arrangements for linking their emissions trading systems. On November 23, 2017, both jurisdictions 
signed an agreement establishing the link,25 which is set to enter into force in the year following exchange 
of the instruments of ratification or approval, with the actual link thus expected to be operational from 
January 1, 2019 or 2020 (preamble). Unlike the arrangement between California, Ontario, and Québec 
described in the preceding section, the agreement between the EU and Switzerland has been adopted in 
the form of a binding international treaty, as required under the linking mandate set out in the legal basis 
of the EU ETS.26 It is divided into nine chapters, titled “General Provisions,” “Technical Provisions,” 
“Aviation,” “Sensitive Information and Security,” “Development of Legislation,” “Joint Committee,” 
“Dispute Settlement,” “Suspension and Termination,” and “Final Provisions.” Several annexes provide 
further design criteria, technical standards on linking, and detailed guidance on sensitive information.
Chapter I declares both emissions trading systems linked (Article 1) but makes the link conditional on 
each system meeting the essential criteria set out in the annexes regarding scope and coverage, registries, 
and auctions and auctioning platforms (Article 2). Chapter II on technical aspects stipulates the mutual 
recognition and fungibility of allowances that operationalize the link and also sets out accounting 
provisions, including periodic transfer of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) to ensure consistency under the 
Kyoto Protocol (Article 4).27 Rather than create one shared registry, the agreement provides for a direct 
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connection between the registries in each trading system, the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL) 
and the Swiss Supplementary Transaction Log (SSTL), and stipulates conditions under which one or both 
parties may temporarily close the registry link (Article 3). Parties also commit to elaborating Linking 
Technical Standards (LTS), which will set out in much greater detail the technical specifications of the 
registry link (Annex II).28
A separate chapter is dedicated to the protection of sensitive information against unauthorized 
disclosure or integrity loss (Articles 8 and 9), with several annexes specifying the security requirements, 
the sensitivity levels, and relevant handling instructions (Annexes II, III, and IV). Several provisions set 
out notification and coordination obligations with regard to legislative and other activities that may affect 
the link (Articles 10 and 11), and either party can request a meeting of a Joint Committee composed of 
representatives of each party (Article 12). Its functions are to administer the agreement and ensure its 
proper implementation, adopt new or amending existing annexes, discuss amendments to the agreement, 
facilitate the exchange of views on domestic measures that may affect the link as well as suspension or 
termination of the agreement, settle disputes, and conduct periodic reviews of the link to ensure that, inter 
alia, the link does not undermine emissions reductions targets or the integrity and orderly functioning of 
each carbon market. Finally, the agreement also lists the conditions under which a party may suspend the 
link (Article 15) as well as the procedure for termination (Article 16), and it makes provision for unilateral 
or joint linkage with third parties (Article 18). 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NORTHEAST ASIA
Based on the foregoing conceptual analysis and case studies, a number of recommendations can be 
formulated for the legal and institutional architecture of a future Northeast Asian carbon market based 
on linked emissions trading systems. First, parties to such a link should ensure their regulatory framework 
specifies a mandate for linkage, setting out the required legal authority, attendant procedure, and—if 
applicable—any minimum conditions for linkage. An 
explicit mandate not only helps support the robustness 
of an eventual link but also sends a clear signal about the 
political willingness to cooperate on carbon trading and 
increases transparency about procedural and substantive 
requirements for linking in the respective jurisdiction. 
Where linking occurs on a mutual basis, especially where 
it is implemented through a formal arrangement such as 
an international treaty, parties have to take care to specify 
the rules, modalities, and procedures applicable to the 
link, addressing operational issues, such as notification 
and consultation provisions to ensure coordination of the 
link, as well as more systemic issues, such as amendments, 
suspension, or termination of the link.
Another important condition for the sustained acceptance of a linking arrangement can be expressed 
in procedural terms during the process of establishment, but also in its subsequent operation. At all stages 
of its elaboration, a linking arrangement should seek to ensure transparency; provisions on linking should 
be clearly worded and precise, the processes leading to their adoption clearly described, and the institutions 
Perhaps the most important 
condition of a successful link, 
therefore, remains a mutual 
commitment to acting in good 
faith, striving for transparency 
and fairness, and favoring a 
culture of long-term cooperation 
over short-term self-interest.
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they create governed by a defined mandate. Involvement by affected stakeholders and the public when 
designing the link can further help improve acceptance and confidence in the market. Once the linking 
arrangement enters into force, disputes and irregularities may nonetheless arise across the link, necessitating 
a mechanism to settle disputes but also raising the question of accountability, with regard to both market 
participants and supervising institutions. A linking arrangement should therefore consider not only routine 
operation of the link but also unexpected circumstances and situations. 
Both case studies surveyed in greater detail here—the link between California, Ontario, and Québec 
and the link between the EU and Switzerland—have opted to spell out all these aspects, and more, in 
the arrangements they put in place between themselves to create the carbon trading link. Still, not all 
eventualities can be anticipated and set out beforehand in a linking instrument. Perhaps the most important 
condition of a successful link, therefore, remains a mutual commitment to acting in good faith, striving 
for transparency and fairness, and favoring a culture of long-term cooperation over short-term self-interest. 
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international organizations.
277KLVH[HPSOLÀHVWKHQHFHVVDU\SURYLVLRQIRUIXWXUHFRUUHVSRQGLQJDGMXVWPHQWVXQGHU$UWLFOHRIWKH3DULV$JUHHPHQW
something that is acknowledged in the preamble of the linking agreement between the EU and Switzerland: Welcoming 
the Agreement reached at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in Paris on 12 December 2015, and 
recognizing that the accounting issues resulting from that Agreement will be looked at in due course.
28 Such LTS shall, for instance, specify the architecture of the communication link, the security of data transfer, the 
OLVWRIIXQFWLRQVWKHGHÀQLWLRQRIWKHZHEVHUYLFHVWKHGDWDORJJLQJUHTXLUHPHQWVWKHRSHUDWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVWKH
communication activation plan, the testing procedure, and the security-testing procedure.
